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RESTRUCTURING FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES: IMPACT OF PROPOSED REFORMS
ON ESTATE PLANNING
Verner F. Chaffin*

is undeniable that estate and gift taxes, in contrast to income
taxes, have not received the legislative attention that they deserve.
CongTess has largely ignored these important segments of our tax
structure for many years, and during that time a host of defects and
inequities have become apparent. This congTessional indifference in
the estate and gift tax field can be attributed to the fact that these
taxes, unlike the income tax, affect relatively few people, and that
they produce less than two per cent of our total tax revenue.1 It is understandable, therefore, that while the majar thrust of the Tax Reform
Act of 19692 was to correct certain inequities in the income taxation
of individuals, corporations, trusts, and estates, the Act did not deal
directly with estate and gift taxation.8
The Treasury Department had proposed major reforms in estate
and gift taxation in 1969, however,4 and hearings were held before
the House Ways and Means Committee in March of that year. 5
While the proposals were not fully deliberated by the CongTess during 1969, there is every indication that the suggestions are still very
much alive and that later this year or in early 1971 CongTess will
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I. TAX FOUNDATION, INC., FAcrs AND FIGURES ON GoVERNMENT FINANCE 93 (15th ed.
1969). In 1966 there were only 67,000 estate tax returns filed giving rise to tax liability
and only 30,000 such gift tax returns, compared to 57,000,000 such income tax returns.
Kurtz, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Changes: Some Arguments in Favor of Treasury's
Reform Proposals, 108 TRUSTS & EsTATES 458 (1969).
2. T::ix Reform Act of 1969, P.L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sec•
tions of 26 U.S.C.).
3. Many of the income tax reforms contained in the Act will have profound effects
on estate planning. Although these income tax innovations are beyond the scope of
this Article, it should be noted that the major changes relevant to estate planning
deal with the taxation of charitable trusts, the new throwback and multiple-trust
rules applicable to accumulation trusts, and the taxation of trusts having income for
the benefit of the grantor's spouse. Changes were also made affecting charitable contributions, and new curbs were placed on private foundations. See Joint Sess. of Tax
Section & Trusts & Estates Law Section of the N.Y. Bar Assn., Tax Reforms Affecting
Trusts and Estates, 109 TRUSTS & EsTATES 339 (1970).
4. U.S. TREASURY DEPT., 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REFoRM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS,
pt. 3, at 329-409 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter 1969 Proposals].
5. Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 3969-4104 (1969) [hereinafter Tax Reform Hearings]. For
transcripts of selected testimony, both pro and con, taken at these hearings, see Kurtz,
supra note l; Panel Discussion-Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Transcripts of
Selected Testimony on Treasury Proposals, 108 TRUSTS Be ESTATES 674 (1969).
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give them priority attention.6 One may expect, therefore, that comprehensive changes in our estate and gift tax laws will be seriously
considered during the next two-year period.
The changes suggested by the Treasury Department include an
overhaul of the marital deduction, the institution of tax-free gifts
between husband and wife, the integration of the gift and estate
taxes, the imposition of a capital gains tax on the unrealized appreciation of assets held by a decedent until the time of his death, and the
imposition of additional taxes on generation-skipping transfers. 7
These sweeping innovations are responsive, in part at least, to the
demands for wholesale review of the gift and estate tax laws that have
been made with increasing frequency during the past several years. 8
The major source of the Treasury's proposals was the study conducted under the auspices of the American Law Institute (ALI), with
Professor A James Casner as Reporter. 0 This study was initiated in
1963, and its recommendations were presented to the annual meeting
6. Mr. Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, in an
address delivered at Boston, Massachusetts, on September 30, 1969, indicated that the
Nixon Administration would press for more tax reform in 1970 and particularly for
the improvement of the estate and gift tax provisions. See Berkowitz, Estate and Gift
Tax Reform-An Overview, 109 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 12 (1970). Similar statements were
also made by Mr. K. Martin Worthy, Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service,
in an address delivered in Houston, Texas, before the Houston Business and Estate
Planning Council and the Houston Estate and Financial Forum on May 12, 1970. See
21 U.S. TAX WEEK 614 (1970).
The Nixon Administration has proposed legislation to the 1970 Congress that would
accelerate the payment of gift and estate taxes. The filing of a gift tax return and the
payment of the gift tax would be required on a quarterly basis with respect to
transfers made after December 31, 1970. Since under present law gift tax returns are
filed on a calendar year basis (INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2501, 6019), it is currently
possible to defer payment of the tax for up to 15½ months after the gift is made. INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 6075(b). Payment of an estimated estate tax, consisting of 80% of
the estate tax that would be due if the gross estate were valued as of the date of death,
would be required within seven months after the decedent's death in cases in which
the value of the gross estate exceeds $150,000. Present law requires the filing of the
estate tax return within fifteen months after the decedent's death. INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 6075(a). The existing gift and estate tax rates would not be changed (INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, §§ 2001, 2502) by these proposals, and the alternate valuation under
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2032, would still be available for estate tax purposes. The
recommended acceleration would result in approximately $1.5 billion in additional
revenue for fiscal year 1971. TAX RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT, 91ST CONG,, 2D
SESS. at 1, 9-19 (Comm. Print 1970). Hearings on the above proposals were scheduled to
commence September 9, 1970. House Comm. on Ways and Means Release No. 26
(undated).
7. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 331-96.
8. A sampling of recent critical articles includes Caplin, Federal Tax Policy-The
Need for Reform, 56 GEO. L.J. 880 (1968); Draheim, The Dilemma of Married Couples
Under the Gift and Estate Tax Laws: The Need for Reform, 3 VALPARAISO U. L. REv.
206 (1969); Kurtz, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Changes: Some Arguments in Favor of
the Treasury's Reform Proposals, 108 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 458 (1969): Comment, A Survey
of Generation-Skipping Transfers-The Present Rule and the Possibility of Reform,
'22 Sw. L.J. 482 (1968).
9. ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE&: GIFr TAXATION (Official Draft 1969).
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of the American Law Institute in 1968. The purpose of the ALI project was to recommend improvements in present estate and gift tax
laws, "not only to surmount their purely technical deficiencies but
also to enhance the fairness and the wisdom of the policies that they
are shaped to serve." 10 Professor Casner's work has received widespread attention, and the question of the desirability of many of the
recommended changes has evoked considerable healthy debate.11
Quite naturally, the Treasury's proposals also have been subjected to
much advance criticism and discussion. 12
The regeneration of professional interest in this long-neglected
area is a wholesome sign, and the robust disagreement and controversy will inevitably result in better legislation, regardless of the
form that it ultimately takes. This Article will attempt to analyze the
reforms that have been suggested, and to assess their impact upon
e."isting estate-planning practices.

I. THE

MARITAL DEDUCTION

The Treasury's proposals call for sweeping changes in the maritaldeduction and gift-splitting provisions of the present Internal Revenue Code (Code).13 These changes would be accomplished by (1)
replacing the present fifty per cent limitation with an unlimited
marital deduction; (2) allowing gift-splitting between spouses in both
inter vivos and death transfers on any desired basis; (3) allowing terminable interests to qualify for the deduction; and (4) permitting the
spouses to determine by waiver the extent to which the deduction is
to be available in their respective estates.14 According to the Treasury's rationale, these changes will afford substantial tax benefits to
small and moderate estates, provide flexibility in transfers between
10. Foreword to ALI, FEDERAL EsTATE &: GIFI' TAXATION at vii (Official Draft 1969).
11. See, e.g., Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major Issues Presented in the American Law Institute Project, 22 TAX L. R.Ev. 635 (1967); Casner,
American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 22 TAX L. R.Ev. 515 (1967);
McDonald, Unsatisfied at Any Price: A Summary of the Proposals Presently Under Consideration in the American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 21 TAX.
LAw. 329 (1968); ALI Recommendations on Estate and Gift Taxation, ll REAL PROP·
ERTY, PRODATE &: TRUST J. 111 (1968); ALI Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, 2 REAL
PROPERTY, PRODATE &: TRUST J. 463 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Berkowitz, Estate and Gift Tax Reform-An Overview, 109 TRUSTS &:
EsTATES 12 (1970); Brown, A Case Against an Additional Tax on Generation-Skipping
Transfers, 106 TRusrs &: EsTATES 997 (1967); Dane, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reform:
Some Argt:ments Against the Treasury Proposals, 108 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 782 (1969);
Marshall &: Crumbley, Reform Proposals for Taxation of Capital Gains: Some Alternate Suggestions, 108 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 871 (1969); Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal
Gift and Estate Tax Reform Proposals, 108 TRusrs &: EsTATES 664 (1969).
Ill. Citations are to the INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, incorporating all amendments
through July 15, 1970.
14. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. ll, at 377-80.

214

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:211

husband and wife, and reduce the complexity of the present maritaldeduction rules.111 While no one would dispute these laudable objectives, there is room for great doubt that the proposed revisions will
effectively accomplish the stated goals.
Under present law, the marital deduction is available for both
estate and gift tax purposes for transfers of property from one spouse
to another. In inter vivas transfers, the deduction is limited to fifty
per cent of the value of each gift to the donee spouse;16 for transfers
at death, the deduction is limited to fifty per cent of the adjusted
gross estate of the donor spouse.17 The portion of the gift in excess
of the allowable deduction is then subject to the applicable tax.
Transfers qualify for the marital deduction only if the donee spouse
is given outright ownership or its equivalent-such as the right to receive all income from a trust for life coupled with a general power
of appointment over the principal-over the subject matter of the
gift or bequest.18
A. Removal of the Present Maximum Limit on the Estate Tax
Marital Deduction

Under the Treasury's proposals, the present fifty per cent limit
on the estate tax marital deduction would be removed entirely and
replaced by an unlimited marital deduction, thereby making possible completely tax-free transfers of property at death between husband and wife. 19 This proposal, on its face at least, possesses some
attractive features. There is merit in the underlying basic notion
that transfers between spouses are not appropriate occasions for
imposing a tax. When a husband bequeaths property to his wife, 20
the property has not moved down a generation; it therefore can be
argued from a policy perspective that such a transfer should not
be regarded as a taxable event, although a transfer tax would, of
course, be imposed upon the wife's death.
Moreover, an unrestricted estate tax marital deduction would
eliminate the need for the exceedingly complex and cumbersome
formula and fractional-share clauses now utilized by draftsmen in
wills to give the surviving spouse an amount equal to the marital
15. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 358.
16. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2523.
17. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
18. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
19. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 358.
20. For purposes of convenience, it will generally be asssumed in this Article that
the donor spouse is the husband, and that the donee spouse is the wife. The law is
identical, of course, when the roles are reversed. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-l{a)
(1955).
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deduction. The present percentage limitation leads to the "exactly
half and not one penny more" approach21 to estate planning, since
overfunding normally results in increased transfer taxes at the death
of the donee spouse, and underfunding causes a partial loss of the
deduction and hence increased taxes in the donor's estate. As a result, estate planners are excessively preoccupied with the task of
describing a quantum exactly equal to the available deduction. This
quest for exactitude gives a warped emphasis to estate planning and
too frequently results in the indiscriminate use of "boiler plate"
clauses and the making of unnatural and unwise dispositive arrangements. 22 Removal of the percentage limitation would eliminate the
quest for mathematical precision and would free draftsmen to deal
with matters of greater human concern. Under this proposal, a husband would have the option of simply leaving the bulk of his estate
to his wife without paying any estate or gift tax, and without concern
about "overqualifying" the amount of the gift.
The Treasury's proposal is, however, seriously deficient in a
number of respects. One of the obvious problems is the loss of revenue to the Government. The principal advantages of the marital deduction to spouses are that it makes lower tax brackets available for
each of their estates and that it postpones payment of the estate tax,
thereby making the funds that would have been used to pay estate
taxes available for use during the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
Marital-deduction property passing to a spouse may escape estate
taxation altogether if it is used or given away during the surviving
spouse's lifetime. Revenue losses of this type are, of course, inherent
in any marital-deduction provision, but they would be increased
21. The phrase "exactly half and not one penny more" was used by Professor
Polasky in his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee. See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4076. Earlier he had used the "not one penny
more" phraseology in Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning
-Estate and Income Tax Considerations, 63 MICH. L. REv. 809, 813 (1965).
There are a -variety of techniques by which the amount of the estate tax marital
deduction may be expressed. Professor Casner lists the following methods: (a) nonformula pecuniary gift; (b) formula pecuniary gift; (c) nonformula fractional-share gift
of the residue; and (d) formula fractional-share gift of the residue. I J. CASNER,
EsTATE PLANNING 791-95 (3d ed. 1961). See also R. COVEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCllON AND
THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS (1966); J. FARR, AN EsTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK
299-301 (3d ed. 1966); Polasky, supra.
22. Mr. Covey asserts that "a majority of lawyers using formula provisions do not
have a satisfactory understanding of their operation. In many cases the lawyer has
simply gone to a form book and copied a formula provision into the will he is
drafting without giving any consideration to how the form will operate upon the
client's death." Preface to R. COVEY, supra note 21, at v. Professor Polasky, in testimony given before the House Ways and Means Committee, characterized the dispositions produced by marital deduction clauses as "a distorted, attenuated pattern of
asset disposition which few attorneys, in their wildest flights of fancy, would suggest
••••" Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4073.
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significantly if the percentage limitation were removed. By the Treasury's own estimate, the complete exemption of interspousal transfers would result in a thirteen per cent reduction of present estate
and gift tax revenues-about 500 million dollars-declining to a
ten per cent reduction after a ten-year period.23
This revenue loss could perhaps be dismissed on the assumption
that the deficiency would be made up elsewhere if the proposal
otherwise possessed sufficient merit. But there are other objectionable
features that combine with the loss-of-revenue factor to render the
suggested revision undesirable and unnecessary. The Treasury has
painted an overly pessimistic picture of the tax impact of the present marital deduction on smaller estates in which widows are left
to support and educate minor children.24 The Treasury fears that
because a bequest equal to the present marital deduction might not
leave such a widow with adequate funds, a husband might feel compelled to give his entire estate, or substantially more than half of it,
outright to her. The overfunding would be taxed in his estate, and
a second tax would be imposed on whatever remained of the excess
at the widow's death.2 5
This double taxation would occur in the situation described, but
it is submitted that the disposition contained in the Treasury's example is an atypical one that no competent draftsman would advise.
The preferred procedure would be to give the wife one half of the
adjusted gross estate in a form that qualifies for the marital deduction; the residuary estate would then be placed in a nonmarital
family trust containing encroachment powers over the corpus for
the support of the widow and children, and with an ultimate gift
over to the children or other named beneficiaries at the termination
of the trust. The corpus of the nonmarital trust would not be included in the wife's estate at her death. Thus, in its zeal for reform
the Treasury has conjured up a problem where none really existsat least not in carefully planned estates.
The principal fault with the marital deduction, however, is not
its rate but rather the fact that it functions in an across-the-board
manner without regard to the economic needs of the surviving
spouse and dependent members of the family. The deduction applies
uniformly, regardless of the size of the estate and without taking
into account the decedent's ethical obligation to support his depen23. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. I, at 44. Mr. Robert F. Spindell charged
in his testimony that this was a " 'sop' • . • to win support for the other radical
proposals." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4007.
24. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 358.
25. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 359.
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dents or to maintain his surviving spouse in a comfortable standard
of living. An unlimited marital deduction is not needed in larger
estates; this is not to say that such a deduction would benefit the
larger estate unduly, but simply that it is unnecessary. Because of the
progressive rate structure, completely tax-free interspousal transfers
would not be fully utilized in estates of considerable size because the
initial tax saving achieved in the donor's estate would be more than
offset by the tax imposed at the time of the death of the recipient
spouse.
In the great majority of cases, the present marital deduction is
sufficient to provide the widow with a tax-free amount adequate for
her needs. I£ the unlimited deduction is to be employed at all, it
should be applicable only to estates of less than a prescribed value,
with the fifty per cent deduction applying to that portion of an
estate which exceeds this ceiling.26 This scheme would involve additional complexity, but it would be far better than according an
across-the-board one hundred per cent deduction for all estates, because it would distinguish between estates that need the increased
deduction and those that do not. However, in view of the difficulties
in applying two sets of varying deductions to a single estate, it seems
preferable to leave the marital deduction at a uniform rate.
Assuming that a uniform rate is the more feasible mechanism
for allowing the marital deduction, it appears that the existing limit
is the most desirable. I£ the present maximum limit were removed
there would be an impetus for tax savings at the expense of natural
objects of the donor's bounty other than the spouse. A husband,
for example, might be tempted to leave all his estate to his wife,
perhaps to the detriment of his children by a former marriage.
Removal of the percentage limitation would also discriminate even
further against the unmarried taxpayer for whom no deduction exists. Although this type of inequity is inherent in the present marital deduction, there is no reason to increase the existing unfairness
in the absence of some overriding positive gain.

B. Removal of the Present Maximum Limit on the Gift Tax
Marital Deduction
Another of the Treasury's proposals, which is consistent with its
proposed unlimited marital deduction for death transfers, would remove the present fifty per cent limit on deductions for inter vivos
26. Professor Westfall has proposed a combined unlimited and limited marital
deduction, the former applying to adjusted gross estates of $100,000 or under, and
the latter to the execs.!. Westfall, supra note 12, at 996-97.
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transfers between husband and wife. 27 This recommendation is designed to eliminate present differences in the tax treatment of interspousal gifts made in community property states and those made in
common-law jurisdictions, and to reduce the tax incentives for making gifts that result from the gift-splitting advantages that exist under
present law.26 The basic notion behind the proposed change is that
the presently required tax scrutiny of such transfers dictates an unnatural keeping of records between husband and wife, and that many
gifts go unreported without detection because effective enforcement
in this area is impossible.29
When property is given inter vivos by one spouse to another,
the community property states do in fact enjoy a gift tax advantage
under present law. Suppose, for example, that a husband owns property valued at 250,000 dollars and that he wishes to give his wife
one half of this amount. In a common-law state, his transfer of a
one-half interest in the property to his wife would result in gift tax
liability. Ignoring exemptions, his tax would be based on the value
of the gift-125,000 dollars-less the fifty per cent marital deduction. Thus, a taxable gift of 62,500 dollars would be involved. In a
community property state, however, the wife automatically has a
one-half interest in the property of her husband by operation of
law; thus, the husband would not have to make a transfer subject
to the gift tax in order to accomplish the same result that the husband in the common-law state could achieve only by making a
taxable gift.80 The unlimited marital deduction proposed by the
Treasury would, of course, eliminate this discrepancy, since a husband in a common-law state could deduct the full amount of any
interspousal gift.
27. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2523(a).
28. See 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 358-59.
29. Mr. Laurens Williams, testifying before the House "\Vays and Means Committee,
pointed to the "enormous amount of non-compliance" and advocated changes in present gift tax laws to make "honest taxpayers out of taxpayers." Tax Reform Hearings,
supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4043-44.
30. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2523(£)(1), however, provides that the marital deduction shall not be allowed for transfers of property held as community property
at the time of the gift. Thus, in our example, if the husband in the community
property state subsequently decided to transfer to his wife his own interest in the
community property, the transfer would be subject to a gift tax on the full value of
the property transferred-$125,000. The husband in the common-law state, however,
could claim the 50% marital deduction if he decided to transfer to his wife the
$125,000 interest he had retained in the property. Thus, his taxable gift would only
equal $62,500. Under these circumstances, the husbands in both the community property
and common-law states would have placed title to property valued at $250,000 in their
wives, and would have been taxed on $125,000 worth of gifts.
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Since the writer is opposed to the removal of the percentage
limitation for transfers at death, logic would dictate opposition to
a similar recommendation for inter vivos tranfers. Moreover, one
is led to the conclusion that the interspousal-transfer problem is not
nearly so important as the Treasury suggests it to be. In the first
place, whether an interspousal gift has been made for federal tax
purposes depends upon whether or not the transfer or expenditure
is in satisfaction of a legal obligation of support imposed by the law
of the donor's domicile. 31 The vast majority of transfers between
!II. Broadly speaking, the test for determining whether a transfer is taxable for
gift tax purposes is the absence of an adequate or full consideration in money or
money's worth. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2512(b). It is clear that a transfer in discharge
of a legal obligation to support a dependent, other than the transferor's spouse, is not
a gift if the value of the property transferred is not in excess of the support obligation.
C. LoWNDES &: R. KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXES § !12.6 (2d ed. 1962). There
is some confusion, however, whether the discharge of a support obligation to a spouse
is sufficient consideration to negative a taxable gift. For estate tax purposes, the relinquishment of dower, curtesy, statutory substitutes therefor, or "other marital rights"
does not constitute consideration "in money or money's worth," and therefore a
transfer in exchange for these rights constitutes a taxable transfer. INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 204!1(b). In defining transfers for insufficient consideration for gift tax purposes, the regulations have adopted this same position without the aid of any specific
statutory provision. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1955).
The Treasury, however, has taken the position that the right of a spouse to be
supported-unlike the marital rights of dower, curtesy, or their statutory substitutesis a sufficient consideration to prevent a transfer from being treated as a gift for gift
tax purposes. In E.T. 19, 2 Cuu. BULL. 166 (1946), the Treasury recognized that marital
settlements that involve a relinquishment of support rights cannot be subjected to a
gift tax, except to the extent that the value of the property transferred exceeds the
value of the support rights released.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1955) does not specifically mention the release of support
rights in defining transfers for an insufficient consideration. But after mentioning some
marital rights, the regulation specifically includes a transfer in return for the relinquishment of "other marital rights" as not being considered consideration "in money or
money's worth." Hence, in relinquishment cases, there is uncertainty whether the
wife's right to support is included in "other marital rights" that are not regarded as
consideration under the estate and gift tax statutes and regulations. The tax court
passed up an opportunity to resolve that uncertainty in Dwight v. Ellis, 51 T.C. 182
(1968). That case involved an antenuptial agreement under which a trust was established for the benefit of the wife pursuant to her release of any claim to a widow's
allowance, dower, homestead, community estate, or support and alimony. The issue
was whether the amount of the trust transfer could be reduced by the value of the
support rights that the wife relinquished. The court refused to decide this question
on the ground that the attempted relinquishment of support rights was void under
local state law.
It appears to be generally assumed that transfers made to a spouse in discharge
of the husband's support obligation, which do not involve relinquishment of marital
rights, are not taxable gifts. Thus, Professor Bittker, in commenting on E.T. 19,
supra, stated that "presumably the proposition that one does not incur a gift
tax liability by supporting his wife or children in an amicable family setting was
thought so obvious as not to require an explicit statement." B. BlTTKER, FEDERAL
INCOME, EsTATE &: GIFT TAXATION 1035 (3d ed. 1964). Similarly, Professor West•
fall, without citing supporting authority, also has asserted that transfers from
husband to wife in discharge of support obligations do not involve taxable gifts.
Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARv. L REv. 986, 998
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husband and wife are probably not "gifts" at all, but rather nontaxable support obligations.32
Second, it may be suggested that the matter of husband-wife
transfers is not sufficiently important to cause excitement. Professor
Westfall has aptly pointed out that in 1966 gifts between spouses
amounted to less than eight per cent of the aggregate value of gifts
reported that year, and that almost one half of these transfers were
fully covered by the gift tax marital deduction.33 Even conceding
that a number of gifts were unreported, perhaps the Treasury could
better devote its energies to solving problems of greater magnitude.
Failure to remove the present fifty per cent limit, of course,
would leave unresolved the discrimination against taxpayers who
do not live in community property states. This problem cannot be
effectively dealt with except by adopting an unlimited deduction for
lifetime gifts. Professor Westfall has nevertheless suggested that
"allowing unrestricted deathtime splitting of transfers by both the
decedent and the surviving spouse" would be a possible solution.3~
But it is difficult to see how deathtime gift-splitting by itself would
accomplish much since the limited deduction would still be operative for inter vivos transfers. Perhaps the best answer is to suggest
that the inequality is largely theoretical, and that, in reality, few
persons are seriously affected by it. It would be preferable to tolerate isolated instances of unequal treatment than to move to the
unlimited deduction for all transfers between spouses, both inter
vivos and at death.
(1970). This conclusion is consistent with INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 677(b), which
imposes a tax on the grantor of a trust to the extent that income is applied or distributed for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally
obligated to support or maintain. The use of trust income, for example, to discharge
an obligation of the grantor to support his wife is regarded as the equivalent of the
reservation of income by the grantor. First Natl. Bank v. United States, 211 F. Supp.
403 (N.D. Ala. 1962) (estate tax case).
32. For example, in Rasmussen v. Oshkosh Savings &: Loan Assn., 35 Wis. 2d 605,
151 N.W.2d 730 (1967), the husband had customarily turned over his weekly paycheck
to his wife so that she could run the household and pay the bills. Upon the wife's
death, the issue arose whether the wife's estate or the husband was entitled to the
surplus household funds that had accumulated. The court held that the husband was
the owner of the surplus on the ground that "there was a failure to show by clear
and convincing evidence that a gift ••• was intended." 35 Wis. 2d at 612-13, 151 N.W.
2d at 734. Apparently the parties had conceded that no gift was made of the sums
actually expended in running the household. See also Hooker v. Commissioner, 174
F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949); Edward B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543 (1948); Herbert Jones, I T.C.
1207 (1943). But cf. Meyer's Estate v. Commissione. 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 651 (1940) (estate tax case); Robert M. McKeown, 25 T.C. 697 (1956); Paul
Rosenthal, 17 T.C. 1047 (1951), revd. on other grounds, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
33. Westfall, supra note 31, at 998.
34; Id. at 999.
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Gift-Splitting

Under present law, an inter vivas gift made by a taxpayer to any
person other than his spouse may be treated for gift tax purposes
as if made one half by him and one half by his spouse.35 This device,
which enables a donor effectively to double the amount of his
annual exclusion and specific exemption, is called "gift-splitting."
No gift-splitting is currently permitted for transfers made by a surviving spouse after the death of the decedent spouse.36 The Treasury
proposes that a husband and wife be allowed to split gifts made to
third persons during their joint lifetimes on any proportional basis
consented to by the nondonor spouse; splitting of transfers at death
would also be permitted by allowing the surviving spouse or her
personal representative to treat the transfer of any portion of the
decedent's estate as a transfer by her.81
By extending gift-splitting to transfers made at death, post-mortem planning would be greatly facilitated. The respective estates
of the spouses could be equalized for transfer tax purposes through
elections made by the surviving spouse or the personal representative
of the deceased spouse, regardless of the order of death or the size
of the respective estates. In addition, the new rule would eliminate
the need for resort to indirect methods to produce the effect of giftsplitting in testamentary transfers.38 It is therefore urged that the
Treasury's proposal be adopted.

D. The Terminable-Interest Rule
A terminable interest is one that will fail upon the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of an event or contingency; and, generally speaking,
any such interest that passes from the decedent to his surviving
spouse will not qualify for the estate tax marital deduction. 39 The
practical effect of this rule is to disallow any interspousal bequest
that is designed to avoid the imposition of a tax upon the death of
the survivor. The surviving spouse, therefore, must be given the
35. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2513.
!16. Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-l(b)(l) (1955) provides that consent by the decedent
spouse's personal representative "is not effective with respect to gifts made by the
surviving spouse during the portion of the calendar year that his spouse was deceased."
37. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 380. A particular transfer could be
treated as having been made by the husband, by the wife, or by the husband and
wife in whatever proportions the parties wish.
38. As Professor Casner has pointed out, the functional equivalent of gift-splitting
may be indirectly accomplished in a deathtime transfer-e.g., H makes a maritaldeduction gift to W by will, and W in turn gives the property to a beneficiary under
H's will. ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE &: GIFT TAXATION 37-38 (Official Draft 1969).
!19. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2056(b).
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equivalent of absolute ownership in order for the gift to qualify for
the marital deduction in the decedent spouse's estate. For example,
a devise by a husband to his wife of a life estate with a remainder
over to their children would not qualify.40 But if the wife is given
the right to receive all the income along with an unqualified power
to appoint the property, the gift to her qualifies for the marital
deduction.41
The availability of the marital deduction turns on (1) whether it
is the decedent or his spouse who has the power to name the remaindermen who will take after the wife's life estate; and, if the
latter, (2) whether her power is general or special.42 Moreover, if
the husband's estate contains nonqualified terminable interests,
these are deemed to be used first in satisfying a general bequest to
the wife, and the amount of the marital deduction is consequently
reduced by the value of such interests.43
In order to remedy this technicality-laden situation, the Treasury proposes that the restrictions upon the types of interests that
qualify for the marital deduction be liberalized so that any gift or
bequest to a spouse of the enjoyment, use, or income from property
would be available for the marital deduction if the recipient spouse
is willing to treat the subsequent termination of her interest as a
taxable transfer by her. 44 Thus, a husband could make adequate provision for his wife, without losing the benefit of the marital deduction, by creating a testamentary trust that did not give her the power
to divert the principal away from his children. For example, assume
that H's will sets up a trust, income payable to W for life or until
she µiay remarry, remainder to H's children, and with no power in
W to change the devolution of the property. The income interest
given to W would qualify for the marital deduction in H's estate
under the proposed change. Upon termination of W's interest,
either by death or remarriage, she would be deemed to have made a
transfer and the property would be taxed at that time. In other words,
no transfer tax would be exacted at H's death; the tax would be
imposed only at the termination of W's limited interest, and that
termination would be taxed as a transfer made by her. The operation
40. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-l(g), example (1) (1955).
41. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2056(b)(5). The property would be included in the
wife's estate for estate tax purposes. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2041.
42. A general power is one that a donee may exercise in favor of herself, her estate,
or either. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
43. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(2). This reduction may be prevented by a
provision in the will that only qualified assets shall be used to satisfy gifts to the
spouse. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-2(d) (1955).
44. 1969 PRoPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 8, at 858, 860, 877-78.
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of the new rule, of course, would have the effect of taxing W on
the assumed "transfer" of assets not controlled by her, but which
in fact pass to the predetermined class of remaindermen under H's
will. Since it would be inequitable to subject W's other assets to
the payment of taxes on this hypothetical transfer by her, the tax
would be collectible only out of the property that was subject to
the marital deduction. 45
The elimination of the terminable-interest rule can only be seen
as a positive gain. At best this rule is made up of highly technical
requirements that not only produce much litigation but often frustrate good-faith efforts to meet its demands. It would be a great advantage to the donor to be able to obtain the marital deduction
without placing the control of the property in the hands of the
donee spouse. The area of qualified marital-deduction gifts would
be tremendously expanded by the adoption of the new proposal,
and wiser estate planning would result.

E. Waiver of the Marital Deduction
The Treasury's final recommendation concerning the marital
deduction is based on the assumption that "spouses should be given
the power to determine the extent to which they wish the marital
deduction to apply, and thus the extent to which the transferred
property will be subject to tax upon subsequent disposition by the
transferee spouse."46 The present Code does not expressly authorize
the donee spouse to elect immediately to pay, at the time of the
transfer to her, the tax on a gift that qualifies for the marital deduction, and thereby to eliminate taxation when she subsequently transfers the property to others. Failure to claim the marital deduction at
the time of the donor spouse's death will not reduce the tax on the
donee spouse's estate.
The Treasury's proposal, in effect, would permit a waiver of the
marital deduction in whole or in part, as the spouses may determine.
If the husband's estate has paid the full tax on a marital-deduction
gift to his wife, this payment would eliminate the tax on that prop45. The amount subject to taxation would be the value of the property at the time
the transfer by the donee spouse is deemed to occur. When the transfer occurs at the
surviving spouse's death, the tax attributable to such property would be the amount
by which the total tax at death exceeds the tax that otherwise would have been
payable if the property had not been included in the donee's estate. When the transfer
occurs during the donee's life, the tax would be the pro rata portion of the entire tax
payable on all transfers during the same period. When the income interest is subject
to a power in the trustee to invade the corpus for the benefit of others, any such payments from the corpus would be treated as transfers by the donee spouse at the time
such payments are made. See 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 378.
46. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 358.
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erty when it subsequently passes to others at her death. Clearly, this
waiver rule would give greater flexibility to post-death planning,
particularly in situations in which it would be preferable to have
the gift taxed at the time of its making rather than at the death of
the recipient spouse.
.
What is overlooked, however, is the fact that the husband may
accomplish this result under present law by making a gift to his wife
of an interest that does not qualify for the marital deduction. This
course of action insures that the gift is taxed in his estate and not
in that of his wife. Even if the terminable-interest rule were abolished, a gift not subject to the marital deduction could still be accomplished by giving the wife something less than the current
enjoyment, use, or income from the property.47
Under the proposal, in order for marital-deduction property to
escape taxation at the wife's death it would be necessary to trace the
assets in her estate back to property that previously had been taxed
in the husband's estate. The burden would be on the widow's personal representative to identify such property as previously taxed
marital-deduction property. This tracing would appear to be an
insuperable task when the interest is given to her outright; and even
in the case of a trust, there possibly would be inordinate delay and
litigation. Based on the difficulty of tracing marital-deduction property, and on the present availability of alternatives, it may be concluded that this waiver proposal is ill-adapted to orderly and
expeditious estate administration, and that it should not seriously be
considered as part of a reform package.
II.

THE UNIFIED TRANSFER TAX

Under existing law, inter vivos transfers by gift are subject to
the gift tax with its exemptions, exclusions, and rate schedule. A
lifetime exemption of 30,000 dollars is provided48 in addition to
annual exemptions of 3,000 dollars per donee49 and special treatment
accorded gifts made by husband and wife to third persons.50 Transfers at death, however, are taxed under the estate tax, which has a
separate structure. Among its distinctive features are the 60,000-dollar specific exemption, 51 the complete exclusion of charitable gifts
from taxation at death, 52 and the estate tax marital deduction. 53 Vari47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 377-78.
R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2521.
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2503(b).
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2513.
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2052.
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2055.
INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
INT.
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ous costs-such as funeral and administration expenses, and claims
against the estate-are deductible in arriving at the net estate subject
to tax.'1¼
This dual tax structure has spawned an elaborate set of rules concerning which tax should apply in a given situation, and there is
much uncertainty on the question of "completeness" for gift tax purposes.Im In addition, there are situations in which inter vivos transfers
subject to gift taxation are also treated as transfers at death subject
to estate taxation. Double-transfer taxation may occur when the donor
transfers property during his lifetime but retains either an interest in
the property or a possibility of recovering the property that is sufficient
to make it includible in his estate.56 For example, if the donor creates
an inter vivos trust and reserves-either singly or in combinationthe power to revoke or alter the arrangement57 or the right to determine the ultimate devolution of either income or corpus, 58 or if
he retains a life interest59 or a reversionary interest that is valued at
more than five per cent of the property,00 then the value of the
property subject to such powers, rights, or interests is includible in
his estate. The same result would be reached if the transfer were
treated as one made in contemplation of death, even though none of
the above powers were present. 61 When a transfer falls into this area
of double taxation, the situation is partially alleviated by the allowance of a credit for the gift tax paid against the estate tax assessed. 62
Also, the double scheme may lead to estate tax savings through the
use of deliberate deathbed gifts, since only the net amount of such
gifts is brought back into the estate and subjected to the estate tax.
The estate tax levy would thus be reduced because the amount of the
previously paid gift tax would not be present in the estate and hence
would escape estate taxation.
The present law favors inter vivos gifts over death transfers. By
taking advantage of the liberal exclusions from gift taxation, it is
possible for a donor to make significant gifts during his lifetime with54. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2053.
55. For discussions of the issue of completeness, see Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288
U.S. 280 (1933), and Holtz's Estate v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 37 (1962).
56. The overlap between gift and estate taxes is treated in C. LoWNDES &: R. KRAMER,
supra note 31, at §§ 28.2-.13.
57. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
58. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2038.
59. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2036.
60. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2037.
61. Any transfer in contemplation of death, if made within three years of death,
is included in the donor's estate and subjected to tax as if the gift had not been made.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
62. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2012.

226

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:211

out the imposition of any gift tax at all. Even when some gift tax is
payable, the rates are twenty-five per cent lower than estate tax
rates. 63 Moreover, because the donor pays the gift tax out of his own
funds after the transfer, the amount of the gift tax itself is not included in the tax base. In contrast, the estate tax is imposed on the
value of the estate, which includes the amount used to pay the tax.
The total value of lifetime gifts is disregarded in determining the
estate tax rate applicable to property transferred at death. Thus, a
donor, by a combination of inter vivos gifts and transfers of property
at death, may make optimal use of both sets of exemptions and receive the lowest possible rates in the respective rate schedules for the
two taxes. A husband, for example, who during his life gave to his
children 200,000 dollars of his 500,000-dollar taxable estate would
have removed this amount from his estate and hence from the
thirty-two per cent estate tax bracket; the gift tax on the amounts
transferred inter vivos would have been computed at rates ranging
from zero to 22½ per cent-the exact rate depending on the amount
of other gifts, the annual exclusion, the lifetime exemptions, and
the availability of gift-splitting with his wife. Moreover, any amount
paid as gift tax would no longer be in the estate and therefore would
not be includible in the estate tax base. The estate tax would then
be computed after all deductions and exemptions had been taken
into account.
The Treasury Department proposes to eliminate the distinction
in tax treatment between lifetime and deathtime transfers by making
the total tax burden the same, whether gifts are made inter vivos, at
death, or by a combination of these two methods. 64 Estate and gift
taxes would be combined into a unified transfer tax, subject to a
single 60,000-dollar exemption plus a complete exemption for transfers between spouses. A single rate schedule would be applicable to
the transfer, regardless of when it is made. The base of the unified
tax would include the amount of tax paid on lifetime gifts in order
to conform to the present method of taxing transfers at death. 65
The over-all 60,000-dollar exemption could be used against inter
vivos or death transfers at the option of the donor. To the extent that
this exemption is not used up during the taxpayer's lifetime, it would
be applied against transfers at death. Retention of the 3,000-dollar
63. INT. R.Ev. Co»E of 1954, §§ 2001 (estate tax rates); 2502 (gift tax rates).
64. 1969 PROPOSAIS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 355.
65. This procedure is referred to as "grossing-up"-i.e., including the amount of
the tax in the amount of the gift upon which the tax is computed. The Treasury
promises a simplified table to compute the grossed-up transfer. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra
note 4, pt. 3, at 355.
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annual exclusion per donee would continue to provide at least some
incentive for making lifetime gifts. A transfer tax return would be
filed for each calendar year in which gifts were made to any single
donee in excess of the annual exclusion. Upon the death of the
donor, a return would be filed if the total amount of transfers at
death, when added to the sum of all lifetime gifts, amounted to more
than 60,000 dollars. In other words, the tax rate applicable to transfers at death would be based upon the aggregate of previous lifetime
transfers.
The additional revenues derived from the unified transfer tax66
would permit a reduction of about twenty per cent from the present
estate tax rates, presumably to be accomplished over a ten-year period.67 The present credit allowed for state death taxes68 would not
be changed, but the credit for tax on prior transfers would, of course,
be eliminated.
The integration of estate and gift taxes would undeniably accomplish the Treasury's stated objective of reducing the "inequitable and unwarranted preferences for lifetime gifts, as opposed to
transfers at death.'' 69 The time of making the transfer would be immaterial because the unified-tax rate schedule would be applicable
to all transfers, whether they be inter vivos or testamentary. The
proposal would also do away with the problem of gifts made in contemplation of death70 and the litigation that such transfers have
engendered concerning the motives of the deceased donor. 71 It
66. The increased revenue yield stems from the fact that the single $60,000 exemp•
tion is less than the total $90,000 combined gift tax and estate tax exemptions allowed
under INT. REY. CODE of 1954, §§ 2052, 2521. The projected increase is estimated at
7%. ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE &: GIFT TAXATION 78 (Official Draft 1969).
67. The top estate tax bracket, now 77% (INT. REY. CODE of 1954, § 2001), would be
reduced to around 65%, Other tax brackets would be reduced about 20%, except
for the lowest bracket of 3%, In general, the progression in the lower brackets of the
present estate and gift tax rates would be reduced, and the progression in the upper
brackets would be increased. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 355-56.
68. INT. REY. CoDE of 1954, § 2011.
69. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 351.
70. The present contemplation-of-death rule would, however, still be applied to
transfers of ownership of an insurance policy within three years prior to the insured's
death. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 362.
·
71. According to the leading case of United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931),
the ultimate test for determining whether a transfer is in contemplation of death is
the mental attitude of the donor-i.e., whether the thought of death was the dominant
motive prompting the transfer or whether the gift was primarily actuated by motives
associated with life. These criteria are incorporated in Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-l(c) (1955).
The donor's advanced age or ill health (Estate of Mabel Lloyd Ridgely v. United
States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas, 1J 12,481 (Ct. Cl. 1967), in which a gift of a summer cottage
was made by an eighty-eight-year-old donor in ill health for the past five years); the
purpose of reducing estate taxes (Fatler v. Usry, 269 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. La. 1967), in
which gifts were made on the advice of an attorney to save estate taxes, although the
donees were not in need of funds and there was no prior gift pattern); the size of the
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would also eliminate, of course, the overlap between estate and gift
taxes and the computation of the gift tax credit under existing
law.72
No one can seriously fault the proposal in terms of its accomplishment of these needed changes. Since persons who transfer equal
amounts of wealth would pay equal taxes, a potential donor would
be free to decide, apart from tax consequences, whether to give away
property during his lifetime or to hold it until death. It would appear,
however, that the major defects in the present dual system could be
cured by means short of substituting a completely new and different
tax structure. Present statutes could be amended to remove most of
the undesirable features. I£ it is desired to reduce the tax incentives
for inter vivos gifts, the gift tax rate structure could be revised to
eliminate the differential, and mutually exclusive lines could be
drawn between complete and incomplete gifts for purposes of both
taxes.73 A "grossing-up" provision could be adopted to include the
gift tax as well as the gift itself in the amount of the transfer. It
would be simpler to accomplish this grossing-up at the time the gift
is made instead of at death as the Treasury proposes. A delayed
grossing-up at death, by adding to the taxable estate the amount of
gift in relation to the donor's estate (Estate of Robert W. Hite, 49 T.C. 580 (1968), in
which the court considered the fact that the gifts were quite large in relation to
what the donor retained, along with other factors such as age, ill health, and the
absence of a long-established policy of giving); and the purpose of utilizing the trans•
fer as a will substitute (Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
in which the fact that the donor was a trustee of a gift of stock in trust, with the
duration of the trust set well beyond his life expectancy, indicated a motive to make
a gift as part of a testamentary plan) are factors that tend to indicate that the gift
was made in contemplation of death.
On the other hand, a purpose of reducing income taxes (Carlson v. United States,
61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 12,016 (D. Minn. 1960), in which the dominant purpose of a
gift made by a donor after suffering a serious heart attack was held to involve income
tax considerations); a pattern of similar gifts in the past (Estate of Errett Ross Crum,
28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 946 (1969), in which a seventy-seven-year-old donor had a fixedgift plan of affording limited business and financial assistance to donees); or the fact
that the gift was made for a particular purpose ordinarily connected with life (Estate
of John Baxter v. United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 12,546 (E.D. Ark. 1968), in
which the donor desired to reward his sons who had assumed managerial responsibilities and to provide for special current financial needs), tend to show that a transfer
was not made in contemplation of death.
The artificiality and unpredictability of these nebulous criteria has led one study
to assert that "the idea of weighing motives as though they were blocks of ice
borders on the fantastic." C. LowNDES 8: R. KRAMER, supra note 31, at 68. A collection
of contemplation-of-death cases decided during the last decade is contained in I A.
CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING 303-08 (Supp. 1970).
72. The credit provisions of existing law would be retained in the case of property
now held by a surviving spouse and taxed to the decedent spouse's estate. The maximum
period of extension for such credit would be limited to ten years. 1969 PROPOSALS,
supra note 4, pt. 3, at 371.
73. Professor Casner urges the adoption of a hard-to-complete-gift rule if the dual
system is retained. See ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE 8: GIFT TAXATION 42-43 (Official Draft 1969).
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tax paid on lifetime gifts, would result in administrative headaches
and possibly could give rise to problems concerning the apportionment of the tax between inter vivos and testamentary donees. The
"simplified tables" promised by the Treasury74 to accomplish grossing-up would be anything but simple if previous experience affords
a basis for judgment.
In addition, the unified-tax proposal would place on the executor
the onerous burden of determining the extent to which the decedent
had made taxable transfers during his lifetime. To avoid possible
personal liability, the executor would be required to show lack of
knowledge of tax liability, to make written request to the Internal
Revenue Service for copies of the decedent's transfer tax returns,
and to show that he has examined such returns. 75 Moreover, it is
unrealistic to assume that the ordinary taxpayer would keep the
detailed records of lifetime gifts that would be required by the integrated system.
Another problem would be the transitional period during which
the new rules would govern transfers made after their enactment
and the old dual system would apply to gifts previously made. 76 The
confusion of shifting to an untried system would be magnified if
during a lengthy interim period the old system continued to be
operative.
Although the Treasury proposes that the new unified rate schedule be lowered because a higher revenue yield will automatically
result from the institution of an integrated system, there is no
assurance that Congress would reduce the rates or maintain any rate
reduction in the face of intense current-revenue needs. Indeed, Professor Westfall urges that transfer taxes should be utilized to produce
more revenue, and he therefore opposes removal of the present
higher-bracket rates. 77 But despite the theoretical soundness of this
scheme, Professor Westfall seems to ignore the need for public acceptance of such a proposal. Historically, estate and gift taxes have
not been regarded principally as revenue-raising devices but rather
as measures for social control that prevent the undue accumulation
of wealth by breaking up great family fortunes. 78 Professor Casner
74. See note 65 supra.
75. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 372. The personal representative, after
forty months have elapsed from the time of the decedent's death, may not be held
personally liable for death transfer tax deficiencies of which he had no actual knowledge. Id. at 371-72.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. Westfall, supra note 31, at 990.
78. An elaboration of the theory and philosophy of federal estate and gift taxation
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flatly states that "support for the unified transfer tax rests solidly
on the assumption that the amount of revenue collected from this
source is to be approximately the same whether we retain a dual
system or shift to a unified transfer tax." 79 The likelihood that higher
revenue collections actually may result gives proper cause for alarm. so
The unified transfer tax is keyed to the unlimited estate tax
marital-deduction proposal discussed earlier.81 It would not work
well with the present fifty per cent marital deduction because a
donor who makes substantial lifetime gifts to his children, for instance, would build up the tax rate on his death transfers to the point
that the surviving spouse might not receive an adequate amount
after taxes. 82 The writer's opposition to the unlimited marital deduction provides another reason for opposition to the integrated
transfer tax.
Under the proposed system, the present credit for state death
taxes under section 2011 of the Code would not be changed. 83 Since
the credit would be allowed only on property transferred at death
and therefore would exclude lifetime transfers, state death taxes
would in many cases greatly exceed the allowable credit. Discrepancies between federal and state law may result in the same transfer
being treated as an inter vivos gift under the former and as a death
transfer under the latter. There also would be problems in calculatting the state death tax credit-i. e., whether the credit should be computed on the rates applicable to the value of the property transferred
at death or on the rates actually applied to the death transfer.84 The
two rates would not be the same because the federal government's
death tax rates would be determined in light of lifetime transfers as
well as death transfers.
It may also be objected that the integrated transfer tax would
discourage inter vivos gifts. The desirability of an incentive for lifeis contained in B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL INCOME
1964).

E5rATE &:

GIFT TAXATION 987-1001 (3d ed.

79. ALI, FEDERAL F.sTATE &: GIFT TAX PROJECT 62 (Proposed Draft April 80, 1968)
(statement omitted from the official draft). The American Law Institute took no
position on the choice between a dual or a unified tax system. ALI, FEDERAL F.sTATE &:
GIFT TAXATION 63 (Official Draft 1969).
80. See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3994 (testimony of Mr.
George Craven).
SI. See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
82. As pointed out by Professor Casner, "[t]he 100% marital deduction for deathtime transfers is almost essential where a unified tax is involved." ALI, FEDERAL F.sTATE
&: GIFT TAXATION 35 {Official Draft 1969).
83. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 368.
84. Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3993-94 (testimony of Mr. George
Craven).
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time giving is open to debate,85 but in practical effect the gifts that
would most often be deterred by the removal of the existing incentive
would be those transferred from parents to their children and grandchildren.86 The writer believes that it is socially desirable to encourage benefactions of this type, although it is conceded that the
proposed changes would not seriously affect the economy or investment policy.
It appears, therefore, that the troublesome areas in the Treasury's
proposal overbalance its positive advantages. Any benefits that might
accrue would not be worth their cost in terms of the resulting administrative confusion and of the awesome complexity of shifting to a
drastically different and untried system. The dual tax structure is
viable and the major reforms needed can be effected within its present framework. 87

III.

TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS AT DEATH

A major criticism of our estate tax laws has always been that they
place a premium on passing wealth to the next generation in the
form of appreciated property.88 Property passing at death receives a
"stepped-up" basis in the hands of the beneficiary equal to its fair
market value at the time of the decedent's death,89 or one year thereafter.00 This new basis is not dependent upon the payment of any
income tax by the decedent, his estate, or the ultimate beneficiaries.91
The Treasury Department estimates that this stepped-up basis re85. Widely varying views on the policy aspects are reported in Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at !1982 (testimony of Mr. Jerome Kurtz), !1992 (testimony
of Mr. George Craven), 4005 (testimony of Mr. Robert F. Spindel!), 40!16 (testimony of
Mr. James B. Lewis), 4081 (testimony of Professor Alan N. Polasky).
86. In fairness it should be pointed out that incentives still would exist because of
the annual exclusions and the gift-splitting opportunities. Income tax incentives for
establishing short-term trusts (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 67!1) and present-interest trusts
for minors (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2503(c)) would be unaffected by the proposed
change.
87. Professor Polasky, although a proponent of the unified tax, nevertheless admitted that "it is still possible to accomplish significant reforms through a patching of
the existing dual transfer tax provisions." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at
4082 (testimony of Professor Alan N. Polasky).
88. See, e.g., Hanrahan, A Proposal for Constructive Realization of Gains and Losses
on Transfers of Property by Gift and at Death, 15 KAN. L. REv. l!l!l (1966);
Heckerling, The Death of the "Stepped-Up" Basis at Death, !17 S. CAL. L. REv. 247
(1964); Note, Taxation of Capital Gains at Death, !18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 138 (1969).
89. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
90. The executor may elect to choose the fair market value at date of death or
one year thereafter. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 20!l2(a).
91. Compare the stepped-up basis given property passing at death with the treatment afforded inter vivos gifts, in which the donee takes the donor's basis, thus postponing rather than forgiving the appreciation accruing before the date of the gift.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1015.
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suits in the annual escape from taxation of about 15 billion dollars
of capital gains.92 In addition to the revenue loss and the matter of
unequal treatment of taxpayers with equal ability to pay, there is
also concern over the adverse economic "lock-in" effect produced by
the incentive to hold appreciated assets until death. 93 The Treasury
asserts that "[t]his freezing of investment positions deprives the
economy of the fruits of an unencumbered flow of capital toward
areas of enterprise promising larger rewards." 94
The immunity of unrealized capital gains from taxation operates
to the prejudice of the taxpayer whose estate has been accumulated
from salary or other income that has been taxed as it is earned or
accrued, as opposed to the person whose estate has been enriched
principally through the appreciation of assets held until death. Moreover, this opportunity for tax avoidance is directly proportionate to
the wealth of the taxpayer and the resulting lack of economic compulsion to dispose of capital assets. Assume, for example, that A and B
each purchase 100,000 dollars worth of stock that subsequently appreciates in value to 200,000 dollars. If A is forced by economic circumstances to sell the stock, he must, of course, pay a tax on the
100,000 dollars of capital gain,9is whereas B-who can afford to hold
the shares until his death because he possesses independent resources
-and his legatee will pay no income tax at all on that gain.96
In an effort to alleviate this disparate tax treatment, the Treasury
proposes that appreciated capital assets held at death be treated as
if the decedent had sold such property just prior to death, with the
gain being taxed in the final income tax return filed by his executor.97 All appreciation would be accorded long-term capital gains
treatment regardless of the holding period.98 The tax levied on the
appreciation of capital assets would be allowed as a deduction in
92. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 331.
93. Beazer, Expected Income Changes and the Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains
Tax, 19 NATL. TAX J. 308 (1966); Holt &: Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital
Gains Tax, 15 NATL. TAX J. 337 (1962).
94. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 334. Faced with the reward of total
forgiveness of the tax on appreciation at death, it is reasonable to assume that older
taxpayers in particular would be deterred from selling their appreciated assets.
95. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 1202.
96. In the example, however, the amount of income tax that A. paid as a result
of the capital gain realized would not be included in his estate at death. On the other
hand, the full appreciated fair market value of B's stock would be included in his
estate. If B's estate has a high marginal rate, a substantial portion-up to 77%of the amount which he did not pay in income tax on the capital gains would be
consumed by the estate tax. Thus, the inequity involved, though not insignificant,
is not as great as it appears at first blush.
97. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 334-35.
98. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335-36, 340.
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favor of the estate, and thus would not be included in the decedent's
estate for transfer tax purposes.99 The property would then assume
a stepped-up basis equal to its fair market value at the date of
death,100 as it does under the present Code.101 Gains would be offset
against unrealized losses before computing the tax, and net unrealized losses could be carried back against ordinary income for
the three taxable years prior to the decedent's death. 102 Moreover, if
the property decreased in value after the decedent's death, the transferee could claim a capital loss when he later disposed of it.103 Appreciation on personal household items, except for items exceeding
1,000 dollars in value, would be excluded from taxable income.104
A number of liberalizing provisions have been included in the
proposal in an effort to make the new tax scheme work more fairly
and to relieve the hardship caused by the bunching of taxes at death.
The most important of these relief measures is the exemption from
taxation of appreciation that has occurred prior to the enactment
of the new law.105 In effect a special new basis would be created,
based on fair market value at the time the new law takes effect, and
the new tax would be levied only on future appreciation. Thus, a
person dying within one year after enactment of the new proposal
would be taxed only on gains that accrued during that year.
The proposal would also establish a minimum basis of 60,000
dollars for all taxpayers; 106 as a result, there would be no income tax
at all on the appreciation if the total value of assets transferred at
death were less than this amount. The appreciation on all property
with a total fair market value of less than 60,000 dollars would be
exempt, and only the gain on property having a total basis in excess
of 60,000 dollars would be taxed.107
In addition, no tax would be imposed on the appreciation of
99. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 360. This deduction would reduce the
decedent's taxable estate by the same amount it would have been reduced if the
capital gains tax had been paid after an inter vivos sale. See note 96 supra.
100. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 334-45.
101. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
102. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 336, 341.
103. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 333.
104. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 337, 342-43. This exception would be
meaningless in most cases since most household items, with the exception of antiques
and oriental rugs, experience a rapid deterioration in value.
105. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335, 340, 351.
106. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335.
107. For example, if a decedent died owning assets with a cost basis of $30,000
and a fair market value at the date of death of $60,000, there would be no capital
gains tax on the $30,000 appreciation. If the assets had a fair market value of $80,000
at the time of death, the taxable capital gain on the $50,000 appreciation would be
$20,000.
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assets given by one spouse to the other, regardless of the amount of t
the gift or the increase in value. The transferee spouse, however,
would not receive a new basis, but would carry over the basis of the
decedent.108 Similarly, the gain on assets transferred to charities
would be exempted from tax, and the decedent's basis would be
carried over to the transferee. 109 Present rules for payment of taxes
due at death would be liberalized, and these new rules would apply
to capital gains taxes as well as to transfer taxes.110
These innovations in capital gains treatment are the most important and most controversial recommendations in the reform
package. Taxing these presently untaxed capital gains would produce
an estimated 2 billion dollars in revenue each year. 111 The Treasury's position is that this increased revenue would merely offset the
revenue loss stemming from the reduction in rates under the unified
transfer tax and from the unlimited marital-deduction reforms. 112
Since, as noted above, the writer opposes the unified transfer tax113
and the removal of the percentage limitation on the marital deduction,114 he believes that there should be no revenue loss and hence
that an offsetting tax on unrealized capital gains would be unnecessary.
Apart from the revenue question, however, there are independently valid reasons that make the Treasury's proposal untenable. It
should be pointed out that the present recommendation is basically
a revival of an earlier proposal to tax capital gains at death made
in President Kennedy's tax message to Congress in 1963.115 The
108. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335, 337.
109. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335, 337.
llO. The present Code allows ten-year installment payments of the estate tax when
35% of the estate consists of an interest in a closely held business, or when the
payment of the tax would create "undue hardship." INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6161,
6166. These sections would be expanded to permit installment payment of the gains

tax. Also, stock redemption without payment of the tax would be available (see INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 303). 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 347, 404, 406-08.
111. Berkowitz, Estate and Gift Tax Reform-An Overview, 109 TRUSTS & EsTATES
12 (1970). See also Eilbott, Revenue Gain from Taxation of Decedent's Unrealized
Capital Gains, 22 NATL. TAX J. 506 (1969).
112. The Treasury asserts that "on the average the total taxes paid on death under

these proposals will be substantially the same as is paid for estate taxes under present
law." 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 336.
One critic fears that a subsequent Congress will enact rate increases and that
"taxpayers may be lulled into a false sense of security by the assertions of the
proponents that the effect of the proposal, taken as a unit, will result in no overall
tax increase." Dane, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Some Arguments Against
the Treasury Proposals, 108 TRUSTS & EsTATES 782, 843 (1969). See also text accompanying
notes 77-80 supra.
ll3. See notes 48-87 supra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 19-34 supra and accompanying text.
115. Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comm. on
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proposal was rejected at that time,116 and significantly was not included in the American Law Institute study prepared by Professor
Casner.117
The principal objection to a tax on the appreciation of unsold
property at death is that it would create a deterrent to wealth
accumulation by imposing an onerous burden on the decedent's
estate, particularly when a closely held family business or other nonmarketable asset is involved.118 Such a tax could necessitate the dissolution of many independent businesses, thus precluding their
transfer as going concerns from one generation to another. Planning
for estate liquidity to meet the augmented tax burden at death
would take on greatly increased proportions,119 especially in the case
of an owner who, because of age or physical condition, can obtain
additional life insurance only at greatly increased cost or not at all.
An owner approaching retirement would be forced to sell his business and convert it into more liquid assets, and this practice would
result in increased mergers and concentration of economic power
in the hands of large companies. Because the capital gains tax would
in many instances be larger than the transfer tax, the greatest difficulties would fall on estates least able to raise cash without a forced sale
of assets.
Furthermore, the executor would be burdened with the difficult
task of attempting to ascertain the decedent's cost or other basis
for various items of property that were acquired many years before
death. Presumably, if this basis could not be determined, the entire
value of the property in excess of the 60,000-dollar exemption would
be considered capital gain.
The Treasury's proposed forgiveness of the new tax on appreciation in interspousal transfers, with a carry-over of the decedent's
basis,120 would be of little help in solving the problem of transferring
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 128-37 (1963). A comparison of the similarities and differences between the 1963 proposal and the Treasury's current recommendation is contained in Note, Taxation of Capital Gains at Death, 38 GEo. WASH.
L. R.Ev. 138, 141-47 (1969).
116. See Heckerling, supra note 88.
117. ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE &: GIFr TA.XATION (Official Draft 1969).
118. For an elaboration of these objections, see Tax Reform Hearings, supra note
5, pt. 11, at 3970-75 (testimony of Mr. Samuel F. Foosoner), 4002-04 (testimony of Mr.
Robert F. Spindell), 4086-87 (testimony of Mr. John C. Davis, III), 4096-97 (testimony
of Mr. Henry Bison, Jr.).
119. See Anthoine, Tax Reduction and Reform: A Lawyer's View, 63 CoLUM. L
REV. 808, 815-16 (1963); Koudelis, Some Observations on the Proposed Capital Gains
Reforms, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 289, 316 (1964); Wormser, The Case Against a Capital Gains
Tax at Death, 51 A.B.A.J. 851 (1965).
120. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 335, 337.

236

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:211

a closely held enterprise from one generation to the next. Since most
surviving widows would not be capable of managing a business, an
interspousal disposition generally would not be wise. Assuming,
however, that the husband did leave his business to his wife, the
entire gain computed with reference to the husband's basis would
be taxed when she later sold the enterprise or died owning it. In
other words, the tax is not forgiven in interspousal transfers, but is
merely postponed until a later time-when it could be greater and
more burdensome to pay.
The Treasury's recommendation that allows payment of the tax
in installments over a ten-year period121 has a beguiling ring of
liberality that is more illusory than real. Upon the death of the
owner of a small business, there is generally a period of adjustment
carrying with it lower profit margins while the new management
acquires needed experience. If there has been significant appreciation of the capital assets of the business, it is unrealistic to assume
that the new owners would be able to pay the tax in installments,
plus interest on the unpaid balance, along with current business and
personal income taxes.122 The chances are great that there would
be inadequate collateral to secure the payment of the increased tax
burden, and thus the government would secure a lien on the assets
of the business.128 Such a lien would undoubtedly paralyze financial
operations by destroying the company's borrowing capacity.124
In addition, the Treasury's proposal would require that the District Director be given
ninety days notice of sales of corporate assets of a value greater than
$1000 (other than sales in the ordinary course of business), to notice
of the declaration of a dividend, and to notice of any other action
calculated to have a substantial effect upon the liquidation value of
a firm, including changes in the salaries of officers or directors. Failure to furnish such notice will constitute a default, which will authorize the District Director to enforce his security interests. 125

One critic concluded, in testimony before the House Ways and
121. See note 110 supra.
122. Mr. John C. Davis, III, Chairman of the Board, National Association of Wholesalers, depicted the dire consequences that might conceivably ensue over a projected
twenty-six-year period to an average wholesale firm if the Treasury's proposals were
adopted. See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4087-89 (testimony of Mr.
John C. Davis, III).
123. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 405.
124. One critic has termed the adequate-collateral requirement as "[t]he final nail
in the coffin of the small business." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4090
(testimony of Mr. John C. Davis, III).
125. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 405.
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Means Committee, that "it is a certainty that the District Director
will be either running or liquidating every small business within his
district if this proposal is enacted."126 lt would be intolerable to have
government officials in effect sitting on a company's board of directors with a de facto veto power over management decisions concerning expenditures for capital improvements or additions to inventory.
Another of the Treasury's proposals would allow earnings of the
business accumulated after death to be used for stock redemption of
the decedent's holdings for the purpose of paying the unappreciated
capital gains tax without payment of an accumulated-earnings tax. 127
This proposal would, of course, afford a partial measure of relief for
a business that is able to accumulate sufficient post-death earnings
to make the redemption. However, for the many companies not in
this favorable economic condition following the decedent's death and
therefore unable to use the stock redemption advantage, this proposal
would be unavailing and of no practical consequence.
Since assumed gain in the form of appreciation of capital assets
may never be realized by the legatee, the Treasury's proposals in
effect would impose a tax on property solely because of its ownership. Doubts have been expressed whether, in the absence of a sale
or exchange, unrealized appreciation can properly be considered income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution.128 But even though such a tax might be unwise when viewed
from a policy perspective,129 there probably is little chance for a
successful attack on its constitutionality. Cases decided by the Supreme Court since Eisner v. Macomber130 indicate that there is no
constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to determine that
126. Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4090 (testimony of Mr. John C.
Davis, Ill).
127. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 407. Section 906 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, P.L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 715, amended INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 537, to
provide that an accumulation of earnings by a corporation to fund a redemption made
in order to pay death taxes is not subject to the accumulated-earnings tax.
128. A challenge to the constitutionality of an income tax on unrealized appreciation would be based on Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), in which the Court
held in substance that a gain derived from capital must be severed and realized by the
taxpayer before it can be considered income. See generally Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income,
2!1 TAX L. REv. 231 (1968); Roehner &: Roehner, Realization: Administrative Con•
venience or Constitutional Requirement?, 8 TAX L. REv. 173 (1953).
129. The principal policy objections center around the undesirable economic effect
of the proposed tax in discouraging the transmission at death of a successful incometaxpaying company, thus "undermining the very stability of American business enterprise." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3971 (testimony of Mr. Samuel
J. Foosancr).
130. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See note 128 supra.
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the devolution of appreciated assets at death constitutes an appropriate taxable event.131
Despite the apparent constitutionality of taxing unrealized capital appreciation at death, the many defects in the Treasury's proposals, which were pointed out above, 182 strongly militate against their
enactment. It is obvious, however, that something should be done to
remedy the inequities produced by the immunity from taxation that
such gains enjoy. The fact that assets are held until death rather than
sold during the owner's lifetime should not change the tax impact
on the property owner. On the other hand, no solution should be
adopted that forces the sale or liquidation of a business at the death
of the owner.138 The Treasury's recommendation, although constitutional, creates more problems than it solves, and its drastic impact
would doom countless estate plans to hopeless obsolescence. Thus,
while there is a great need for remedial action, the Treasury's proposals do not provide the answer.
As a compromise solution, it is suggested that recipients assume
a "carry-over" basis for all property passing at death so that the
assets retain the same basis that they had in the hands of the decedent. By thus treating deathtime transfers in the same manner that
inter vivas gifts are presently dealt with under the Code,134 the
"stepped-up" basis would be eliminated. The Treasury, it will be
remembered, has recommended that this be done for interspousal
transfers, with the recipient spouse carrying over the decedent's
basis.135 There is no reason why the same treatment should not be
accorded to all transfers at death. The appreciation would, of course,
ultimately be taxed when the property is later sold, but the effect
would be less drastic than a capital gains tax at the time of death.
The donees would benefit if they are in a lower income bracket
than the decedent was when he died. In any event, the bunching of
taxes at death would be eliminated, and the resulting burden on the
business owner or farmer would be eased.
In fairness, however, it must be conceded that a carry-over basis
would allow an indefinite postponement of the tax, and could give
131. The Supreme Court has refused, in a number of cases decided since 1940, to
adhere to the definition of "gain" that was set out in Eisner v. Macomber. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
132. See text accompanying notes 113-27 supra.
133. While the existing estate tax burden is already great enough to force some
businesses into liquidation, the proposed unappreciated capital gains tax would
greatly lengthen the fatality list.
IM. !NT. R.Ev. ConE of 1954, § 1015(a).
135. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at S35, ~S7.
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rise to considerable difficulty in determining the decedent's basis in
property held by him for a great many years. There would be less
incentive for the donee to sell appreciated property, since his taxable gain would be computed on the decedent's basis. Thus, the existing "lock-in" problem would be extended for an indefinite period
beyond the death of the original owner. 136 Moreover, it may be confidently anticipated that the ingenuity of tax planners would be
exerted to discover a tax-free method of converting one asset into
another.
Despite these deficiencies, the carry-over approach would be a
clear improvement over both the present system and the Treasury's
proposal, and equally important, its enactment would appear to be
politically feasible. It also would be superior to the various other
alternatives that have been suggested as solutions to the problem.187
JV.

GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS

A person with considerable wealth normally will desire to make
gifts or bequests to his wife that qualify for the marital deduction,
and gifts to his children and grandchildren that "skip generations"
for tax purposes. Typically, these dispositions take the form of a
marital-deduction trust and a residuary trust, the income from the
latter being applied to the benefit of the family group for life, with
a special power of appointment in the life beneficiaries exercisable
in favor of the testator's grandchildren or issue.
The present tax structure creates an artificial incentive for the
use of long-term generation-skipping trusts. The movement of property through successive holders of limited interests is not regarded
as a transfer unless the income beneficiary is given the equivalent of
outright ownership. 138 Thus, if the beneficiary has only a life estate
136. It should also be emphasized that any postponement of the tax would amount
in substance to an interest-free loan to the taxpayer. Hanrahan, A Proposal for Constructive Realization of Gains and Losses on Transfers of Property by Gift and at
Death, 15 KAN. L. REv. 133, 149 (1966).
137. One suggested alternative is the taxation of capital gains each year as ordinary income, whether realized or not. This solution would abolish the distinction
in tax treatment between capital gains and ordinary income, and only the appreciation
accruing in the year of death would be included in the decedent's final income tax
return. See, e.g., Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 623-25 (1967). Another possible alternative is the "rollover approach," which would defer until death the tax on net realized gains to the
extent they are reinvested in other property held for the production of income. See
Marshall&: Crumbley, Reform Proposals for Taxation of Capital Gains: Some Alternate
Suggestions, 108 TRUST &: ESTATES 871, 874-75 (1969). The difficulty with these approaches
lies in the impossible administrative burdens produced by their inordinate complexity.
ll!8. An interest that terminates at the death of the decedent is not owned by
him at his death, unless he himself was the transferor. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2036.
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or other limited interest, no portion of the property is includible in
his estate when he dies. By the use of special powers of appointment,
the donor may leave the income beneficiary-for example, his daughte:r-in almost complete control of the property and at the same time
avoid having the property regarded as in her taxable estate when she
dies. 139 For example, if a father leaves property in trust, income to
his son A for life, and then in trust for such of A's children as A
may by will appoint, the property is passed on to the second generation without additional transfer tax at A's death. This succession of
life income interests with limited powers of appointment can be
carried on tax free as long as the Rule Against Perpetuities is not
violated.140
The Treasury has come up with a proposed substitute tax on such
transfers,141 the objective of which is to "obtain a transfer tax with
respect to each generation regardless of whether that generation
receives the property or is skipped in favor of a succeeding generation."142 The substitute tax would be imposed on any arrangement,
whether outright or in trust, that accomplishes the avoidance of a
transfer tax for one generation or more. 148 The amount of the
generation-skipping transfer would be taxed at sixty per cent of the
marginal rate applicable to the donor-taking into account all gifts
made by him, both inter vivos and at death. The purpose of this
rate, of course, is to approximate the tax that would have been paid
on the net gift by the skipped generation. For instance, if property
139. A power that is not exercisable in favor of the holder, his estate, his creditors,
or creditors of his estate is not a general power of appointment. INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 2041(b)(l).
140. For example, assume that the donor establishes a trust, income to his son A
for life, then to such of B's issue as B may by will appoint. The principal will not be
includible in either A's estate or B's estate. Assume that B exercises the power by ap•
pointing the property to be held further in trust, income to B's children for life, with
a remainder gift of the principal to B's grandchildren then living, in equal shares.
The appointive assets will not be included in the estates of B's children; no estate tax
would be imposed on the trust corpus until the death of B's grandchildren. It should
be emphasized that the appointment in favor of B's grandchildren would not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities if all of B's children had been born at the time of the
creation of the trust and B had no further children. Under the "second-look" doctrine,
B's children could be used as the measuring lives and the contingent remainder to the
grandchildren would have to vest, if at all, at the death of the last surviving child.
See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1274-75 (2d ed. 1956);
6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 24.34-.35 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
141. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 388-401.
142. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 389. It is estimated that the generationskipping tax would generate an added 12% in revenue. ALI, FEDERAL :&TA.TE &
GIFT TAXATION 412 (Official Draft 1969).
143. Any transfer to a person more than one degree in relationship below the
donor, or in case of a nonrelative, if the donee is more than twenty-five years younger
than the donor, would be considered a generation-skipping transfer subject to the
substitute tax. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 393.
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is bequeathed to the testator's grandchildren in such a manner that
it is not included in a child's estate, the substitute tax would theoretically compensate for the normal transfer tax that is avoided by
the intervening generation.
The recommendation would allow a member of the skipped
generation to elect to treat the transfer as if it had passed to him,
and was later transferred by him to the next generation. The transfer tax payable on this hypothetical retransfer would constitute the
substitute tax. 144 In effect, a generation-skipping transfer would be
treated as two transfers involving two taxable events. 145
However well conceived in theory these proposals may be, the
recommended tax. on generation-skipping transfers would add an
enormous complexity to the already complex structure of the estate
tax law. The amount of the substitute tax would be added back to
the base of the generation-skipping transfer on which it is computed.
In other words, a gift subject to the substitute tax would be "grossedup" at sixty per cent of the transferor's marginal rate and the tax
would be imposed on that amount; the remaining amount would
constitute the net gift.146
The Treasury's own example of how this new tax would work
may be used to demonstrate the confusion and apprehension that
would be produced in estate planning and estate administration.147
The example involves a transferor in the marginal forty per cent
transfer tax bracket who makes a gift of 50,000 dollars to his grandchild. We are told by the Treasury that the total transfer tax on this
simple gift is computed "by increasing the net gift by 60 per cent of
the actual amount ($30,000) grossed-up for the substitute tax at 60
per cent of [the grandfather's] marginal rate or 24 per cent
($9473.68)."148 This would result in a "regular transfer tax of
$43,859.65 (40 per cent multiplied by the amount of property transferred-$50,000 gift plus $59,649.12 tax) and an immediate generation-skipping tax of $15,789.47 (40 per cent times $39,473.68)."149
The substitute tax would be imposed on 65,789.47 dollars, which
144. 1969 PROPOSAI.S, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 393-95.
145. Theoretically, the elective tax would be imposed on the generation-skipping
transfer as though the property had in fact moved through each generation. The donor
would be taxed on the assumed transfer to the parent of the recipient, and the parent
would pay the elective tax on the constructive transfer from himself to the recipient.
If, however, the donor provided funds for payment of the elective tax, those funds
would constitute a bequest to the parent. 1969 PROPOSALS, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 394.
146. This is similar to the Treasury's proposal for a gross-up of all inter vivos
transfers under a unified-transfer-tax system. See note 65 supra.
147. 1969 PROPOSAI.S, supra note 4, pt. 3, at 397-98.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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constitutes the grossed-up amount required to produce the 50,000dollar gift after deducting the tax.1 50
In addition to the difficult problems of apportionment, the impact of the proposed increased tax burden may be so severe that
generation-skipping dispositions will be virtually eliminated, or at
least drastically curtailed.151 This result would be unfortunate because there are valid nontax reasons for the use of long-term trusts
with limited powers of appointment in estate planning regardless of
their generation-skipping advantages.152 The intricacy of tax computation would, moreover, be magnified in the case of discretionary
trusts for the benefit of a family group composed of two or more
generations, with the trustee being given broad powers to pay out
income and make allocations of principal among the beneficiaries.
It would take years of interpretation by the courts, aided by
statutory amendments and administrative regulations, to make the
proposed plan even minimally comprehensible.153 In the meantime
there would be a period of bewilderment and uncertainty.154 The
Treasury's recommendations go far beyond those contained in the
American Law Institute study, which would impose an additional
tax only on transfers that skipped more than one generation. That
tax would be payable either at the time of the original transfer or
at the time of actual distribution to beneficiaries more than one
150. Id.
151. The suggested tax on generation-skipping transfers has been characterized as
"the most ingenious, yet the most devastating and most unworkable of all the Casner
proposals." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4005 (testimony of Mr.
Robert F. Spindell). It "would make the estate and gift tax system so top heavy that
it would fall of its own weight." Id. at 4006.
152. The most important advantage is the avoidance of overly rigid estate planning. For example, a rigid bequest might provide that at the death of the life tenant
the property shall pass to the surviving children in equal shares, with the issue of
a deceased child sharing per stirpes regardless of their ages or individual needs. By
the use of special powers of appointment, however, flexibility can be achieved and
maximum protection can be afforded the family group during the minority of children
or grandchildren. Provision for the surviving spouse and issue of a deceased child can
be made according to their respective needs and competence to handle the funds. See
J. FARR, AN EsrATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 150, 161-63 (3d ed. 1966).
153. In addition to clarifying, if possible, the grossing-up technique and the method
for determining the applicable rate of the substitute tax, rules would have to be
formulated to determine what constitutes the equivalent of ownership and which recip•
ients other than relatives are to be regarded as generation-skipping transferees. Tax
Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3997-98 (testimony of Mr. George Craven).
Professor Westfall has pointed out that gifts to cousins of the donor would not constitute generation-skipping under the Treasury's proposal. Westfall, Revitalizing the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REv. 986, 1010 n.127 (1970).
154. See Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major Issues Presented
in the American Law Institute Project, 22 TAX L. R:Ev. 635, 636 (1967); Comment, A
Survey of Generation-Skipping Transfers-The Present Rule and the Possibility of
Reform, 22 Sw. LJ. 482, 490-91 (1968).
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degree below the donor.11515 Professor Casner, in the ALI study, expressly rejected the Treasury's present proposal, which bases the
rate of the additional tax on an assumed transfer by the skipped
generation to the recipient, "because of the complications that developed in dealing with all the ramifications of the problem." 1156
Advocates of the additional tax point out that generation skipping is available only to persons of substantial means who can afford
to tie up wealth in long-term trusts,157 and that therefore a more
equitable system is needed for imposing the tax at reasonable intervals in order to prevent an erosion of the tax base.1158 The force of
these arguments is diminished, however, by the facts that the revenue
loss is comparatively smal11159 and that the penalty tax would discourage the wise use of trusts to accomplish normal nontax estateplanning objectives.160 In the absence of greater abuse and misuse
of long-term dispositive arrangements,161 property should be allowed to remain in trust during the permissible period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities without tax consequences.162 Although the Rule
may be a clumsy and imperfect mechanism for determining taxable
155. ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE &: GIFr'TAXAnoN 26-31 (Official Draft 1969). Resolution 2B
was adopted by the American Law Institute at its annual meeting in May 1968-which
the writer attended-by a vote of 116-59. The effect of this resolution would be to
permit the first generation to be skipped, but a tax would be levied on all subsequent
transfers, except for outright gifts. Id. at 31.
156. AU, FEDERAL EsrATE &: G1Fr TAXATION 30 (Official Draft 1969).
157. The point has been made that most trusts created by donors with estates
exceeding $2,000,000 are designed to skip at least one or two generations. Tax Reform
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4036 (testimony of Mr. John B. Lewis).
158. Since the property, after being taxed in the donor's estate, may escape further
taxation for eighty to one hundred years, the progressive rates of the estate and gift
taxes are subverted and their revenue-producing ability is impaired. Tax Reform
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3982-83, 4036 (testimony of Mr. John B. Lewis).
159. Statistics indicate that of the net estates in excess of $300,000 filing estate tax
returns in 1957 and 1959, totaling $7.676 billion in disposable assets, only $793,000,000
(a little over 10%) were placed in trusts with plans that skipped one or more
generations. See Alexander, supra note 154, at 673-74.
160. See Brown, A Case Against an Additional Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers, 106 TRusrs &: EsTATES 997, 998 (1967): Comment, supra note 154, at 490; Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 3997.
161. In this connection it should be noted that § 331 of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, P.L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 592-incorporated into INr. R.Ev. ConE of 1954, §§ 665-69
-has restricted the benefits to be derived from long-term accumulation trusts by
providing for an unlimited throw-back rule.
162. Professor Leach asserts that "our present estate and inheritance tax system
depends upon the wealth of the community going through the wringer every so often,
and in the main it depends upon the Rule Against Perpetuities and its relatives to
prevent the intervals from being too long." Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1124, 1141 (1960). Professor Leach also states that "much
has been written about the iniquity and folly of tying up property in trusts. But a
careful examination of these complaints will usually disclose that they are arguments,
not for fewer trusts, but for better trusts." W. LEACH &: J. LoGAN, CAsEs &: TExT ON
FUTURE lNTEREsTs &: EsTATE PLANNING 238 (1961).

244

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:211

events, it does in fact reduce the time period during which generationskipping transfers may exist.163 Thus, on balance, the Rule Against
Perpetuities is a more desirable means of limiting tax-free intervals
than the Treasury's highly complex proposal or any of the various
alternatives that have been seriously considered.
Each of these other alternatives has complexities and problems
of its own. For example, the English system, which regards the termination of a life interest as a taxable event, 164 results in overtaxation
since it subjects the entire corpus to taxation at the life tenant's
death.165 Moreover, it leaves unanswered problems and opportunities
for tax avoidance through the use of discretionary trusts.166 An accessions tax also would impose a levy upon the termination of limited
interests, and would represent an attempt to provide a procedure
for the taxation of discretionary trusts. 167 Professor Casner and his
163. Apparently, some advocates of the additional tax on generation-skipping
transfers do not clearly perceive the operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in
policing the period during which the property may be tax exempt as it passes through
successive generations. For example, one proponent of reform, in testimony given before the House Ways and Means Committee, attempted to illustrate the need for
change by giving an example of a testamentary trust in which the income was to be
distributed to the testator's children and grandchildren, and at the death of the
survivor of them the trust principal was to be distributed to the surviving great•
grandchildren. It was concluded that "[p]roperty so placed in trust will not be subjected to estate tax again until the great-grandchildren die perhaps 80 or 100 years in
the future." Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4036 (testimony of Mr.
John B. Lewis). The fact is, however, that if children are alive at the time of the
testator's death, the contingent-remainder gift to the great-grandchildren would be
void ab initio under the Rule. The testator's children would be the measuring lives
and it is possible that an interest in a great-grandchild might vest more than twentyone years after the death of the survivor of the children. See o AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY §§ 24.21, 24.26 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES 89-95 (1966); 1 A. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 62.10 (3d ed. 1967); L.
SIMES &: A. SMITH, supra note 140, at §§ 1228, 1265; Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell,
51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 642-46 (1938); Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts
to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1938).
164. Finance Act of 1894, 57 &: 58 Viet. 53, c. 30, §§ 1, 2, as amended, Finance Act
of 1969, c. 32, § 36. See also G. JANTSCHER, TRUSTS &: ESTATE TAXATION 163 (1967).
165. England is the only country that has a generation-skipping tax. It would
be hard to find a worse example. It is common knowledge in the business and political worlds that the staggering inheritance tax rates in England have brought
about such a critical shortage of capital that it is unable to modernize its plants
and compete effectively with other Western European countries.
And, without doubt, the assessment of an estate tax on every generation has
contributed to this end.
Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 11, at 4006 (testimony of Mr. Robert F.
Spindell).
166. See Westfall, supra note 153, at 1011; Comment, supra note 154, at 491.
167. See ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE&: GIFr TAX PROJECT US (Study Draft No. 1, 1965);
Andrews, Reporter's Study of Accessions Tax System, in ALI, FEDERAL EsrATE &: GIFI'
TAXATION 446-589 (Official Draft 1969). The amount of the tax would be based on
wealth received by the donee from various sources, rather than on the donor's privilege
of transferring wealth.
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consultants in the American Law Institute project, however, concluded "that a change-over to an accessions tax system is not a feasible
alternative at this time" 168-a conclusion that was doubtless influenced by the drastic nature of the change and the complicated administrative problems that it would produce. Another possible solution would lie in changing the present law so that certain powers,
now tax exempt, would be included in the estate of the holder. 169
This solution, however, would tend toward the creation of unwisely
rigid future interests, and would eliminate needed flexibility in
draftsmanship.170
Professor Westfall has recently proposed a forty per cent "parental deduction" for transfers to children and grandchildren, with
an increase in estate tax rates to make up for the revenue loss.171 This
plan would give the transferor roughly the same benefit now available in transfers that skip a single generation, and would be analogous to the existing gift tax marital deduction.172 The Treasury's
proposed substitute tax, on the other hand, would apply to multiple
generation-skipping and to transfers to nonrelatives. It is difficult
to see how this hybrid solution would operate any more effectively
than the other suggestions, or how its administration would be any
less burdensome. Therefore, until a better and more workable alternative to the existing system is found, there should be no change.
V.

CONCLUSION

Few would quarrel with the basic policy goals of removing taxpayer inequities and eliminating the techniques for tax avoidance
that are available only to the wealthy. Our estate and gift tax laws
need to be simplified, and the tax burden should be distributed in
an even-handed fashion. The public deserves a tax structure that is
as fair and efficient as possible.
When the Treasury's package of proposed reforms is viewed in
perspective, however, it must be concluded that the Treasury has
failed to sustain the burden of establishing the need for or workability of its recommendations. Although most of the proposals ap168. AU, FEDERAL E.5TATE 8e Gwr TAX PROJEcr 6 (Proposed Draft April 30, 1968).
169. See Comment, supra note 154, at 493.
170. "To regulate events in 1980 the judgment of a mediocre mind on the spot is
incomparably preferable to the guess in 1960 of the greatest man who ever lived.''
W. LEACH 8e J. LOGAN, supra note 162, at 241-42.
171. Westfall, supra note 153, at 1012-13. The transfer would be taxed at 60% as
it moved from father to child, and again at 60% when the wealth passed from child
to grandchild.
172, !NT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 2523.
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pear to be designed to produce good results, they do not stand up
well under critical examination-there is a tremendous gap between
promise and performance in most instances. The only reforms that
meet the test of analytical scrutiny are the elimination of the terminable-interest rule for the marital deduction and the allowance of
gift-splitting between spouses on any desired proportional basis for
both inter vivos and testamentary transfers.
Changes are needed that are more feasible and less onerous and
complex. Until these are forthcoming, it is preferable to live with
the existing law, despite its defects.

